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Lazer: Public School Financing

New York Public School Financing Litigation
Honorable Leon D. Lazer*

ProfessorBarry Latzer:
We resume with a very controversial issue that is actually
sweeping the country in the state constitutional law field, and that
is the role of the state constitution in questions of school
financing. We certainly have an expert with us here today. Judge
Leon D. Lazer wrote the majority opinion in the Levittown' case,
in the Appellate Division, which he will be discussing in part in
his talk; and this, of course, is one of the crucial decisions on this
issue in New York. We are delighted then to greet and hear from
the Honorable Leon D. Lazer.
Hon. Leon D. Lazer:
I think I would be remiss if I did not remark upon my own
pleasure at having with us two judges of the Court of Appeals.
Whenever there might be any discussion of the excellence in the
Court of Appeals, their names would be among the first

* The Honorable Justice Leon D. Lazer is a graduate of the City College of
New York, received an LL.B from New York University Law School. Justice
Lazer served as an Associate Justice of the Appellate Division in the Second
Department from 1979 to 1986 and was a Justice of the Supreme Court from
1973 to 1986. He was a partner in the New York law firm of Shea & Gould;
Town Attorney for the Town of Huntington, New York; member of the
Temporary State Commission to Study Governmental Costs in Nassau and
Suffolk Counties, Chair of Pattern Jury Instructions Committee of the New
York State Association of Supreme Court Justices; author of many published
judicial opinions; member of the American Law Institute; member of the
American and New York State Bar Associations; and the Association of
Supreme Court Justices of New York State. Justice Lazer retired from the
bench in1986.
1 Board of Education, Levittown Union Free School District v. Nyquist, 83
A.D.2d 217, 443 N.Y.S.2d 843 (2d Dep't 1981).
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mentioned. Touro has a rare privilege to have both of them here
today. Now, the title of my address has already been given to
you, but I think that it more appropriately ought to be called
Levittown redux.
The Education Clause of the New York Constitution is short

and direct. This product of the 1894 Constitutional Convention
and its predecessor in 1864 has remained unchanged for over a

hundred years. But in the last twenty years, rather fierce battles
have been fought over its meaning.' Before we get to those
battles, I will pause for a few moments to discuss what school
finance means and what the issue generally is; the method of
financing this system of "free common schools." 5

N.Y. CONsT. art. XI, § 1. The Educational Clause of the New York State
Constitution states in pertinent part: "The legislature shall provide for the
maintenance and support of a system of free common schools, where-in all the
children of this state may be educated." Id. There is no United States
Constitutional provision similar to the Education Article of the New York State
Constitution. See New York State ConstitutionalDecisions: 1995 Compilation,
12 TouRo L. REv. 835 (1996).
1 The text has not changed since 1894, however, N.Y. CoNST. art. XI, § 1
was formerly art. IX, § 1 and was subsequently renumbered art. XI, § 1 on
Nov. 8, 1938. Id.
4 See Campaign For Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 86 N.Y.2d 307, 655
N.E.2d 661, 631 N.Y.S.2d 565 (1995); Board of Education, Levittown Union
Free School District v. Nyquist, 57 N.Y.2d 27, 439 N.E.2d 359, 453
N.Y.S.2d 643 (1982); Reform Educational Financing Inequities Today
[hereinafter R.E.F.I.T.] v. Cuomo, 86 N.Y.2d 279, 655 N.E.2d 647, 631
N.Y.S.2d 551 (1995). Other jurisdictions have had battles regarding their
education clauses. See Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973); Abbott
v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990), in which the New Jersey Supreme Court
has consistently struck down its school finance system because of a failure to
provide through and efficient education. Id. See also Lujan v. Colorado State
Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005, 1025 (Colo. 1982) where the Colorado Supreme
Court upheld its school finance system because it was providing "thorough and
uniform educational opportunities." Id. The majority of states constitutions
include an Educational Clause that requires free public education. Paul W.
Kahn, State Constitutionalism and the Problems of Fairness, 30 VAL. U. L.
REv. 459, 466 (1996).
- Levittown, 57 N.Y.2d at 48 n.7, 439 N.E.2d at 369 n.7, 453 N.Y.S.2d at
653 n.7. See also N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1.
2
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New York's educational system is essentially very similar to
that of the other states. 6 That is, the state itself has the obligation
to educate its children, but, while retaining some overall
supervisory power and providing financial assistance, it delegates
the actual educational function to local school districts which
number seven hundred in New York. Outside the City of New
York, the school districts have the power to impose taxes, such as
real estate taxes, to finance their operations." Taxpayers outside
the cities are generally well aware that the school tax item is the
largest one in their real estate tax bills.9 In the cities, the schools
are financed through the municipal budgets.10 There is no
individual taxing power by a city board of education, and without
that taxing power, the city boards of education compete with
police, fire, transportation, garbage collection, and maintenance
of the various other functions of the government." The city
boards of education also have to share with those other agencies
the financing they need.' 2 This, in the jargon of school finance
litigation, is called municipal overburden. 3 In addition to these
real estate revenues raised by the local school districts, and the
cities through their general tax-raising power, which can, of
course, include income taxes, sales taxes and the like, the state,
through its general revenues and through, as of a year or two
6

See generally Tricia E. Bevelock, Public School Financing Reform:

Renewed Interest in the Courthouse, But Will the Statehouse Follow Suit?, 8
ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 467 (1991).
7Levittown,
8 Id.

57 N.Y.2d at 44, 439 N.E.2d at 366, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 651.
at 44-45, 439 N.E.2d at 367, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 651.

9M.
10 Id.

" Board of Education, Levittown Union Free School Dist. v. Nyquist, 83
A.D.2d 217, 261, 443 N.Y.S.2d 843, 871 (2d Dep't 1981). See also
Levittown, 57 N.Y.2d at 42, 439 N.E.2d at 364, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 649.
112 d.

3 Levittown, 57 N.Y.2d at 53 n.4, 439 N.E.2d at 372 n.4, N.Y.S.2d at 656
n.4. Municipal overburden is a condition "'in which some areas, particularly
urban areas, have exceptionally high non-educational expenses... [so that]
revenues raised by property taxes which might otherwise be used for
education, must be diverted to non-educational purposes.'" (citing Robinson v.
Cahill, 355 A.2d 12 (N.J. 1973)).
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ago, fifty-one different formulas, provides financial aid to the
districts and to the cities.' Aid to education is the largest single
item of the state budget.'" In some districts, in some cases, state
aid provides half or more than half of the revenue available to the
school district.' 6 In the complaints in the cases I am going to be
discussing, the amount of eight billion dollars is mentioned as the
7
amount of the state aid to education. '
While state aid to education comes from general state revenues,
the locally raised financing in non-city school districts comes
from ad valorem real estate taxes. 8 That means taxes based on
the value of real estate, and that means that school districts with
high real estate values have many times more resources available
for the education of their children than poorer districts.' 9
Thinking locally, all of those office buildings and factories down
in the south end of the Town of Huntington are in the Half
Hollow Hills School District. Those buildings and factories do
not send children to school. Yet those buildings produce huge tax
revenues for the school district, as would, for instance, in Nassau
County, the Roosevelt Field shopping areas for the local school
district, as would other commercial and industrial areas. In
addition, in high value or high-priced residential districts, such as
Manhasset or Great Neck, or Lloyd Harbor the values of real
estate is high, and there are high revenues for those school
districts.
In such districts, the school boards are able to spend
approximately, as pleaded in the recent cases, six times as much
per pupil as poorer districts with low real estate values.20 Some
of those poorer districts have been named in the recent litigation.
'4 R.E.F.I.T. v. Cuomo, 152 Misc. 2d 714, 578 N.Y.S.2d 969, 970 (Sup.
Ct. Nassau County 1991).
,5 Levittown, 57 N.Y.2d at 38 n.2, 439 N.E.2d at 363 n.2, 453 N.Y.S.2d

648 n.2.
6 See New York State Constitutional Decisions: 1995 Compilation:
Education,
12 TouRo L. REv. 835, 845 (1995).
7
1 R.E.F.LT., 152 Misc. 2d at 715, 578 N.Y.S.2d at
970.
'1Levittown, 83 A.D.2d at 221, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 846.

19Id.
20
R.E.F.LT.,

152 Misc. 2d at 719, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 972.
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The William Floyd School District, Roosevelt School District,
Brentwood, and even middle class districts like Levittown, have
very little commercial real estate.2 ' Those who attack the
educational finance system argue, and are able to prove, that
affluent districts have better facilities, better equipment, better
teachers, lower pupil teacher ratios, smaller classes, new
curriculum, more extracurricular
schoolbooks, enriched
activities, while the poorer districts have large classes, less
equipment, portable classrooms, run-down facilities, higher
pupil/teacher ratios and minimum curriculum, etc.2 The bottom
line of the argument made against the current school finance
system is that there is a huge disparity in education between that
received by pupils in the rich as opposed to the poorer districts.?
There is an inequality so gross that it allegedly violates the Equal
Protection Clauses of the Federal 24 and State Constitutions2 and
results in violations of the state constitutional mandates for
providing a free education.?
Legal assault on these systems started almost three decades ago,
and the first major victory for those came in Serrano v. Priest27 in
1971 when the California Supreme Court found that the
California school finance system was unconstitutional on two
grounds? The court held that wealth was a suspect classification
and that the local property tax discriminated in favor of richer
districts because the available resources were a function of the
Id. See also Levittown, 57 N.Y.2d 27, 439 N.E.2d 359, 453 N.Y.S.2d
643 (1982).
1 R.E.F.LT., 152 Misc. 2d at 720, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 973.
23R.E.F.LT., 152 Misc. 2d at 719, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 972.
24 U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1. The Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution states in pertinent
part: "No state shall... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." Id.
25 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11. Article I, § 11 provides in pertinent part: "No
21

person shall be denied the equal protection of the law of this state or any
subdivision thereof." Id.
26 See N.Y. CoNST. XI, § 1.
27 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971).
2s Id. at 1244 (stating that "such a system cannot withstand constitutional
challenge and must fall before the equal protection clause.").
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child's parents' wealth or that of his or her school district.29 The
court also held that education was a fundamental right for equal
protection purposes, and that mandated strict scrutiny review.30
The California Supreme Court concluded that there was no
compelling state interest to justify the inequality, 3 scoffing at the
contention that there existed any, meaningful local control in the
poor school districts.32
Well, the United States Supreme Court quickly quenched the
reformist fire, and in San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez33
found that wealth was not a suspect classification and under the
federal constitution, at least, education was not a fundamental
interestm It was not guaranteed by the Federal Constitution, and
therefore rational basis review was appropriate. By a five to four
decision, that attack on the Texas school finance system was
rejected.35
As a result of San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, the
state assaults or the first wave of assaults on state finance systems
came to an end, and a second wave commenced after that, or
shortly after that, in which the thrust was that the Equal
Protection Clauses of the state constitutions were violated by
these kinds of disparities; that education was, indeed, a
fundamental interest under the state constitutions; and therefore,
either strict scrutiny review or intermediate scrutiny was
required. That second wave succeeded, to some degree, and a
number of the school finance systems were held unconstitutional.
As a matter of fact, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, New
Jersey, West Virginia and Wyoming found their systems
unconstitutional. In those states, or some of them, the language
29Id. at

1252-53.

1o Id. at 1249 (stating that "[u ]n der the strict standard applied in such cases,
the state bears the burden of establishing not only that it has a compelling
interest which justifies the law but that the distinctions drawn by the law are
necessary to further its purpose.").
31Id.
32

at 1264.
Id. at 1260.

411 U.S. 1 (1973).
4MId. at 35.
35 Id.
13
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used in the state constitution required the state to provide a
"general and uniform system of schools," or a "thorough and
efficient system of schools."6 Those words don't exist in the
New York Education Article, which simply says: provide a
system of free common schools. 7
Modem commentators, argue that a third wave of assaults now
exists and that wave bases the attack on the finance systems on
the theory that the systems do not provide an "adequate
education." A number of state systems have been overthrown on
the basis of that contention, most prominently Kentucky where
the Kentucky Supreme Court has set out the standards for an
adequate educational program.3

Id. at 44. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-20-302. Section 302 states:
"[I]t is the intent of this subchapter to maintain and foster such local control
consistent with the state's constitutional mandate to assure suitability and
efficiency in the public school system." Id.
37 Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 44. See N. Y. CONST. art. II, § 1. Article I, § 1
states: "The legislature shall provide for the maintenance and support of a
system of free common schools, wherein all the children of this state may be
educated." Id.
31 Rose v. Council for Better Education, 790 S.W.2d 186, 212 (Ky. 1989).
A child's right to an adequate education is a fundamental one
under our Constitution. An efficient system of education
must have as its goal to provide each and every child with at
least the seven following capacities: (i) sufficient oral and
written communication skills to enable students to function in
a complex and rapidly changing civilization; (ii) sufficient
knowledge of economic, social, and political systems to
enable the student to make informed choices; (iii) sufficient
understanding of governmental processes to enable the
student to understand the issues that affect his or her
community, state, and nation; (iv) sufficient self-knowledge
and knowledge of his or her mental and physical wellness;
(v) sufficient grounding in the arts to enable each student to
appreciate his or her cultural and historical heritage; (vi)
sufficient training or preparation for advanced training in
either academic or vocational fields so as to enable each child
to choose and pursue life work intelligently; and (vii)
sufficient levels of academic or vocational skills to enable
public school students to compete favorably with their
36
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New York's venture in school finance litigation started in the
seventies with a lengthy trial in a case entitled Board of
Education, Levittown School District v. Nyquist.39 Twenty-seven
school districts, five major cities, and various parents' groups
joined in the attack. The trial took place before Justice Kingsley
Smith in Nassau County. It took two hundred and seventy seven
days of trial, twenty three thousand pages of testimony, four
hundred exhibits, one hundred and eighty witnesses, to try the
case. Justice Smith declared the system unconstitutional under the
Federal and State Equal Protection Clauses and the Education
Article. 40 After Justice Smith's decision, San Antonio School
District v. Rodriguez came down from the Supreme Court. The
New York Appellate Division, Second Department, held the
system unconstitutional under the State Equal Protection Clause
and the Education Article. 4'
The Appellate Division found education was a highly important
interest in New York and that as far as the state's Equal
Protection Clause was concerned, heightened or intermediate
scrutiny was appropriate. A rational basis approach would not
sustain an attack on the system.42 The Court also found that the
Education Article was violated by a method of finance which fails
to provide a school system capable of providing an education for
many educable children. There is key language in the old
Appellate Division decision which is now in dispute in the current
litigation. The Appellate Division found that such an education
should equip children to be "functioning and productive citizens
in our democracy and competitors in the market and the
marketplace of ideas." 43 As noted, the Court declared the system
unconstitutional.

counterparts in surrounding states, in academics or in the job
market.
Id. at 212.
39 94 Misc. 2d 466, 408 N.Y.S.2d 606 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1978).
40 Id. at 531-32, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 642.
41 Id. at 251, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 864.
42
1d. at 257, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 868.
43 Id. at 249, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 863.
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I am going to skip some of the other language of the Second
Department in the interest of moving our program ahead. In
1982, the Court of Appeals, by a vote of six to one, Judge
Fuchsberg dissenting," modified the Appellate Division
determination, (it was, of course, really a reversal) and declared
the state educational system constitutional. 45 That decision,
written by Judge Jones is the basis for much of the discussion of
what has happened since, in the more recent attempts to
overthrow the state finance system. 6 While in Levittown, the
Court of the Appeals accepted the detailed factual findings of the
lower courts and the Appellate Division's affirmance and
additional findings of facts, it quickly rejected the Appellate
Division's holding of unconstitutionality; held that the San
Antonio School District v. Rodriguez analysis was appropriate;
that intermediate level scrutiny did not apply with reference to the
assaults on the state educational finance system, and accepted the
San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez theory that the rational
basis for the current system was local control of education.' 7
Therefore, the Appellate Division determination was
overturned; the system was declared constitutional." In dealing
with the Education Article, Judge Jones' opinion declared that the
legislature had made prescriptions with reference to minimum
number of days of attendance, required courses, text books,
qualification of teachers, pupil transportation and the like.' 9
These prescriptions provided an education; indeed it connoted a
"sound basic education."0 Judge Jones wrote that New York's
educational expenditures exceeded every other state and it was for
the legislature to make determinations as to how much more
ought to be offered.5 The issue was not, in essence, a judicial
44 57 N.Y.2d 27, 50, 439 N.E.2d 359, 370, 453 N.Y.S.2d 643, 654 (1982)
(Fuchsberg, J., dissenting).
45 Id. at 50, 439 N.E.2d at 370, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 654.
457 N.Y.2d at 27, 439 N.E.2d at 359, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 643.
47 Id.at 42, 439 N.E.2d at 365, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 650.
4s Id. at 41, 439 N.E.2d at 365, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 649.
49 Id. at 47-48, 439 N.E.2d at 368-69, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 652-53.
50 Id. at 48, 439 N.E.2d at 369, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 653.
51Id. at 38, 439 N.E.2d at 363, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 647.
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matter. However, he did say for the court majority that if gross
and glaring inadequacy could be shown, it might be that the
system could be found unconstitutional. 2 In any event, the
Levittown decision ended the first wave of the legal attacks on
New York's educational finance system.
The next wave started in the 1990's with two actions: one
brought for the suburbs in a case called Reform Educational
FinancingInequities Today v. Cuomo [hereinafter "R.E.F.L T. ,,]3

and the other brought on behalf of the school districts in the City
of New York, entitled Campaign for Fiscal Equality v. State
[hereinafter "C.F.E."]. 4 The R.E.F.LT. action was met by a
motion to dismiss, and that motion was granted by Justice
Roberto sitting in Nassau County. 5 Justice Roberto made some
interesting findings: the wealth disparities between districts
statewide at the time Levittown was decided was forty-six to one,
and seventeen to one in Suffolk.56 By the 1990's the disparity in
Suffolk alone was three hundred thirty to one; 57 disparities of one
hundred to one were not uncommon; and nineteen Suffolk
districts were sixteen times richer than the William Floyd School
District.58 William Floyd's per pupil expenditure was $7,107.11
More affluent neighboring school districts spent as much as
$43,000 per pupil. 6° After finding all of this, Justice Roberto
declared that he was bound by the Levittown holding, and
dismissed the case. 61 The ruling was affirmed by the Second
Id. at 48-49, 439 N.E.2d at 369, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 653.
5386 N.Y.2d 279, 655 N.E.2d 647, 631 N.Y.S.2d 551 (1995); 199 A.D.2d
488, 606 N.Y.S.2d 44 (2d Dep't 1993); 152 Misc. 2d 714, 578 N.Y.S.2d 969
(Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1991).
"4205 A.D.2d 272, 619 N.Y.S.2d 699 (1st Dep't 1994), modified, 86 N.Y.2d
307, 655 N.E.2d 661, 631 N.Y.S.2d 565 (1995).
5 R.E.F.LT., 152 Misc. 2d 714, 578 N.Y.S.2d 969 (Sup. Ct. Nassau
County
1991).
56 Id.
at 718, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 971-72.
52

57Id.
58 Id.
59 id.

60

Id.

Id. at 726, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 976 ("Notwithstanding the merits discussed in
this decision, any deviation from the Levittown holding must come from either
61
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The case ultimately came before the Court of

Appeals, and in a three page decision by Judge Levine, the court

declared the school finance system constitutional, and noted that
there was not much difference between the old Levittown case and
the current R.E.F.LT. case.6

However, there is a different result in the C.F.E. case.6' The
New York City school districts argued in this separate case that
the education provided by the statewide system, at least in the
City, fell below minimum standards. 61 It was an inadequate
education. The City also claimed a violation of Title VII of the
1964 Civil Rights Act& and discrimination under the Equal
Protection Clause67 as well. Justice DeGrasse permitted the Title
VII and discrimination causes of action to remain.63 The
the Court of Appeals itself or by legislative action."). See Mountain View
Coach Lines v. Storms, 102 A.D.2d 663, 476 N.Y.S.2d 918 (2d Dep't 1984).
6 R.E.F.LT., 199 A.D.2d 488, 606 N.Y.S.2d 44 (2d Dep't 1993).
63R.E.F.LT., 86 N.Y.2d 279, 285, 655 N.E.2d 647, 649, 631 N.Y.S.2d
551, 553 (1995).
6 Campaign for Fiscal Equality v. State of New York, 205 N.Y.2d 307, 655
N.E.2d 661, 631 N.Y.S.2d 565 (1995).
65C.F.E., 162 Misc. 2d 493, 498, 616 N.Y.S.2d 851, 855 (Sup. Ct. New
York County 1994).
66Id. at 321-22, 655 N.E.2d at 669, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 573; 42 U.S.C. §
2000d (1997). This section of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
provides in pertinent part: "No person in the United States shall on the ground
of race, color or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied
the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance." Id.
67 U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment of
the Constitution provides: "No State shall... deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Id. N.Y. CONsT. art. I, § 11.
Section 11 of the New York State Constitution provides: "No person shall be
denied the equal protection of the laws of this state or any subdivision
thereof." Id.
63C.F.E., 162 Misc. 2d at 500, 616 N.Y.S.2d at 856. Judge DeGrasse held
that a system which is discriminatory in effect, yet without discriminatory
intent, may violate civil rights. Id. He relied on Executive Law § 291(2)
which provides that "it]he opportunity to obtain an education... without
discrimination because of age, race, creed, color, national origin, sex or
marital status... is hereby recognized as and declared to be a civil right."
Id. See N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 291(2) (McKinney 1998).
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Appellate Division, First Department, dismissed the entire
action. 9 It then came before the Court of Appeals. 0 The result
was four opinions.
Let me briefly tell you about these four opinions. We are
talking about a motion to dismiss. Judge DeGrasse dismissed
part of the case, 7' the First Department dismissed the rest of it,7"
and four opinions resulted in the Court of Appeals. 3 The
majority opinion, sustaining two causes of action, was written by
Judge Ciparick, 74 a critical concurring opinion was written by
Judge Levine," and two partial dissents were written by Judge
Simons 76 and Judge George Bundy Smith.Y Interestingly enough,

Judge Ciparick, who wrote the majority opinion, in a footnote,
dissented from the portion of her own opinion that dismissed one
of plaintiffs' causes of action.78 In any event, what is important
and what the current debate is about is that minimally educational
services are not being provided.79 She wrote in her majority
69

C.F.E.,

70C.F.E.,

205 A.D.2d at 278, 619 N.Y.S.2d at 702.

86 N.Y.2d 307, 655 N.E.2d 661, 631 N.Y.S.2d 565 (1995).
C.F.E., 162 Misc. 2d at 500, 616 N.Y.S.2d at 856.
2C.F.E., 205 A.D.2d 272, 619 N.Y.S.2d 699.
73 C.F.E., 86 N.Y.2d 307, 655 N.E.2d 661, 631 N.Y.S.2d 565 (1995).
74 d. at 312-24, 655 N.E.2d at 661-71, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 565-75.
71 Id. at 324-32, 655 N.E.2d at 671-75, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 575-79 (Levine, J.,
concurring).
76 Id.
at 332-44, 655 N.E.2d at 675-82, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 579-86 (Simons, J.,
dissenting in part).
'nId. at 344-59, 655 N.E.2d at 682-91, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 586-95 (Smith, J.,
dissenting in part).
78 Id. at 312, 655 N.E.2d at 663, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 567.
Judge Ciparick
dissents in part from the majority opinion, for reasons stated Judge Smith's
dissent, voting to "reinstate the causes of action on behalf of the municipal
plaintiffs as well as the non-municipal Plaintiffs and to reinstate the second
cause of action insofar as it asserts a violation of the Equal Protection Clause
of the State Constitution." Id. Nevertheless, since Judges Simons, Titone,
Bellacosa and Levine concluded that the community school board lacked
capacity to bring the suit, and the majority opinion applied only to the
remaining non-municipal plaintiffs. Id. The municipal plaintiff's equal
protection claim will no doubt reoccur when this case comes back to the Court
of79Appeals.
71

1d.

at 313, 655 N.E.2d at 664, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 568.
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opinion, which is joined by three other judges: "A sound, basic
education... would consist of the basic literacy, calculating, and
verbal skills necessary to enable children to eventually function
productively as civic participants capable of voting and serving on
a jury." 8 Judge Levine and Judge Simons, as you will hear in a

moment or two, regard that definition, particularly the portion of
it dealing with the language that says, "eventually productively
function as civic participants capable of voting and serving on a
jury," as the definition in the Appellate Division, Second
Department holding in Levittown, which the Court of Appeals had
overturned."'

So, that is why I say it is Levittown redux in this situation.
Judge Ciparick wrote, of course, that major portions of the

complaint should be sustained because, viewing the complaint
liberally, students are not receiving the opportunity to obtain an
education that permits them to speak, and I quote: "effectively in
English, perform basic mathematical calculations... and.., to
acquire the skills, knowledge, and understanding and attitudes

80 Id. at 315-16, 655 N.E.2d at 665-66, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 569-70. N.Y.
CONST. art. XI, § 21 (McKinney 1998). The Education Article provides:
"The legislature shall provide for the maintenance and support of a system of
free common schools, wherein all of the children of this state may be
educated." Id. See Board of Education, Levittown Union Free School
District v. Nyquist, 57 N.Y.2d 27, 48, 439 N.E.2d 359, 369, 453 N.Y.S.2d
643, 653 (1982) (interpreting the term education as provided in article eleven,
section 1 of the New York State Constitution as imposing a duty on the
legislature to ensure the availability of a "sound basic education.").
81 .F.E., 86 N.Y.2d 307, 330, 665 N.E.2d 661, 674, 631 N.Y.S.2d 565,
578 (1995) (Levine, J., dissenting). Judge Levine argued that the majority
unwisely departed from Levittown by holding that the State's constitutional
educational funding responsibility must extend to guaranteeing students the
opportunity to acquire those skills to "function productively as civic
participants." Id. Instead, Levittown set forth a narrower state role, flowing
from New York's historic tradition of dividing responsibility over public
education between state and local school governments, under which the quality
of education necessary to enable students to function in society is largely a
matter of local decision subject to standards and assistance from appropriate
State executive, legislative and administrative bodies. Id. See Levirtoi, 57
N.Y.2d at 45-46, 439 N.E.2d at 367-68, 53 N.Y.S.2d at 651-52.
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necessary to participate in a democratic self-government."82 And
she gives the details, which I now can't give you due to time, as
to the unavailability of the necessary elements to produce such
students as far as physical facilities, curricular, any qualified
teachers and the like.8
The Title VII regulations attack was sustained because the
complaint alleged that as far as the distribution of federal aid,
which is what Title VII deals with, the effect of the state's
educational scheme was to discriminate against students and the
minorities in the City.8 The state allocates thirty-four percent of
its aid to New York City, which has thirty-seven percent of the
state's students, eighty-one percent of whom are minorities,
constituting seventy-four percent of all minority students in the
state. The state had not advanced any justification for the
disparity in aid. 5 So the result, is that the two causes of actions
survived the state's dismissal motion and the matter was
remanded back to the trial courts.8 6
A word about Judge Levine's concurring opinionF and Judge
Simon's partial dissent." They are important because this case is
coming back. Judge Levine will likely still be there, as probably
will at least two likely appointees of Governor Pataki. Judge
Levine was highly critical of the majority opinion. 9 He believed
it adopted the Levittown Appellate Division's view of basic
2 C.F.E., 86 N.Y.2d 307, 318-19, 655 N.E.2d 661, 667, 631 N.Y.S.2d
565, 571 (1995).
83 Id. Judge Ciparick found that plaintiffs properly stated a cause of action
based upon factual allegations of "inadequacies in physical facilities, curricula,
numbers of qualified teachers, availability of text books, etc." Id.
84Id. at 324, 655 N.E.2d at 670-71, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 574-75.
85 Id. See Georgia State Conference of Branches of NAACP v. Georgia, 775
F.2d 1403, 1417 (11th Cir. 1985). See also Groves v. Alabama State Bd. of
Educ., 776 F. Supp. 1518, 1523 (M.D. Ala. 1991).

86 Id.

v Id. at 324-32, 655 N.E.2d at 671-75, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 575-79 (Levine, J.,
concurring).
88Id. at 332-44, 655 N.E.2d at 675-82, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 579-86 (Simons, J.,
dissenting in part).
89 Id. at 324-32, 655 N.E.2d at 671-75, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 575-79 (Levine, J.,
concurring).
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education guaranteed by Article XI. He quotes from that decision
which had cited to a Washington case, Seattle School DistrictNo.
1 v. Washington,1° that the educational opportunities which are
constitutionally required are those "'in the contemporary setting
to equip our children for their role as citizens and as potential
competitors in today's market as well as in the marketplace of
ideas."' 91 The Appellate Division majority opinion went on to
say that "we believe that section 1 of Article XI of the New York
Constitution requires no less."9
The Court of Appeals in
Levittown, as a matter of law, held to the contrary.93 Thus, Judge
Levine was of the view that the majority opinion in C.F.E. flies
in the face of the Court of Appeals in Levittown.Y
Judge Simons was also critical, contending that how we
distribute the state's revenues and the local revenues is a matter
for the legislature.9 The best way for me to handle what he did
is to quote him:
I believe that the constitutional duty is satisfied if the state creates
the structure for a State-wide system of schools in which children
are given the opportunities to acquire an education and supports
it. It is for other branches of government, not the courts, to
define what constitutes a sound, basic education and, assuming
the state has not defaulted on its duty to establish a State-wide
system and provide financial support to insure that the
opportunity to be educated is available to all. In my view,

9 585 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1978).
91C.F.E., 86 N.Y.2d. 307, 328-29, 655 N.E.2d 661, 673, 631 N.Y.S.2d
565, 577 (citing Levittown, 83 A.D.2d 217, 249, 443 N.Y.S.2d 843, 863
(quoting Seattle School Dist. No. 1 v. Washington, 90 Wash.2d 476, 517, 585
P.2d 71, 94) (Wash. 1978)).
92 C.F.E., 86 N.Y.2d at 329, 655 N.E.2d at 673, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 577
(quoting Levittown, 83 A.D.2d at 249, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 843).
3Id. at 329, 655 N.E.2d at 674, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 578. (citing to Levittomi,
83 A.D.2d at 248-49, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 863 (holding that plaintiffs and
intervenors inLevittown had not established or even claimed that the State's
public education funding scheme failed to provide the educational; opportunity
required by Article XI, § 1 of the New York State Constitution)).
91Id. at 330, 655 N.E.2d at 674, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 578.
95Id. at 333, 655 N.E.2d at 676, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 580.
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plaintiffs have not successfully pleaded that the State has violated
that duty.'
Both Judge Levine and Judge Simons concurred, Judge Simons
partially, in the majority opinion,9" but only because the complaint
itself, which had to be viewed liberally, had declared that
children were simply not receiving any education that would even
fit the definition in Levittown."' So, the concurrence by Judge
Levine and Judge Simons certainly does not indicate that when
the case comes back up that there will be a similar result.
Judge George Bundy Smith felt that the majority opinion did not
go far enough, and in almost an emotional opinion, asserted that
the Federal and State Equal Protection Clauses were violated. 99
So, what we have is a complaint sustained with reference to the
education article of the State Constitution and the Title VII
implementing regulations, which has been remanded back to the
trial courts.y ® I spoke to Justice DeGrasse yesterday and he told
me that the discovery was ongoing. So the current attack is part
of the national third wave attack that I mentioned to you earlier. 0'
It's an attack on adequacy. After the case comes back to the
Court of Appeals, we may learn whether New York will join
Washington, Kentucky, Connecticut, Tennessee, Massachusetts,
Arizona, Texas, New Hampshire, Wyoming, New Jersey, West
Virginia, Montana, Arkansas and Vermont in declaring their
systems unconstitutional, or whether it will remain with the other
states that either have not faced the challenge or have found their
96Id.
97 Id. at 324-32, 655 N.E.2d at 671-75, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 575-79 (Levine, J.,
concurring); 86 N.Y.2d at 312-24, 655 N.E.2d at 661-71, 631 N.Y.S.2d at
565-75 (majority, joined in part by Simons, J.).
981d. at 325, 655 N.E.2d at 671, 631 N.E.2d at 575. Judge Levine agreed
with the majority, holding that since the "complaint also refers to specific
educational deficiencies and alleges that the State's funding scheme denies
New York City public school students the opportunity to achieve even basic
literacy . . . [the allegations] are sufficient to withstand the motion to
dismiss.... " Id.
99 Id. at 344-58, 655 N.E.2d at 682-91, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 586-95.
'ooId. at 314-24, 655 N.E.2d at 664-71, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 568-75.
101Id. at 312, 655 N.E.2d at 663, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 567.
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systems constitutional. So the saga continues, and I suspect some
day Touro will hold a similar conference to review the ultimate
judgement. Thank you.
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